ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

I have not made reference to the fact that there is an Act of the
Assembly of this state conferring the right on the Diamond Match
Company-, a corporation of the state of Connecticut, to hold real
and personal property, and to transact its business within this
state, for although the act is mentioned in the brief of the respondent's attorneys, and referred to in the argument, it is nowhere stated
in. the record sent up to us from the court below.
The ownership of the property and the transaction of the business of a foreign corporation is admitted by the respondent in his
answer. The obligations arising from state comity are the same as
those that would arise from such an act of the General Assembly,
and would be so regarded by the courts of law.
For the reasons which I have stated I think that the judgment
of the court below should be affirmed with costs.
HOUSTON, J., concurred in the opinion of the Chancellor, and
GRUBB, J., dissented.
Judgment affirmed.
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BANKRUPTCY.
ropferty of Bankrupt not recovered by Assignee.-The fact that an

assignee in bankruptcy has not recovered the property assigned or realized its money value, within the time limited by the bankrupt law, does
not give the bankrupt or his creditors a right to recover the property :
Hount v. Afanhattan Co., 41 N. J. Eq.
I From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 115 Ill.
Rep.
2 From J. W. Spaulding, Esq., Report r; to appear in 78 Me. Rep.

3 From T. K. Skinker,'Esq. The cases will probably appear in 85 or 86 Mo. Rep.
4 From Hon. John H. Stewart, Reporter; to appear in 41 N. J. Eq. Reports.
5 From Arnold Green, Esq.. Reporter; appear in 15 R. I. Reports.
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See Husband and Wife.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
See Municipal Corporation.
Streets-Crantof Use for Railway-Rght of Public to use Tracks.
-A city council, under the Illinois Incorporation Act, may grant to
private individuals or to a private corporation the right to lay railroad
tracks in the streets, connecting with public railway tracks previously
laid, and extending to the manufacturing establishments or warehouses
of those laying the tracks, but in such case the tracks so laid become,
in legal contemplation, part of the railway with which they connect, and
are open to the public, and subject to public control in all respects as
other railway tracks: Chicago Dock Co. v. Garrity, 115 Ill.
The use of the streets of a city, whether for vehicles drawn by
animals, for riding upon animals, for footmen, or for the passage of
railway cars, must be for the public. No corporation or individual can
acquire an exclusive right to their use, or for merely private purposes
Id.
Railroad tracks laid on streets of a city, connected with existing railroads, and extending to public warehouses, malt houses, or manufacturing establishments, or to public wharves and landings, are in their nature
public, and for the public good, and all railroad companies are required
by law to permit such connections to be made with their tracks: Id.

Restraint of Trade-OrdinancerequiringRailroads to Report.-The
ordinance of St. Louis, requiring street railroads to make quarterly reports of the number of passengers carried, is not void as being unreasonable or in restraint of trade, and is not in violation of art. 5, of the
Amendments of the Constitution of the United States: City of St. Louis
v. St. Louis Rd. Co., 85 or 86 Mo.
Local LVeqislation- Class containing One .ember-Judicial Notice of
Census.-Where an act provides "that in all counties in this state in
which is located a city of over 50,000 inhabitants there shall be, and
there is hereby established, a reform school for'the punishment, reform
and education of juvenile offenders as hereinafter provided," it violates
those provisions contained in sect. 53, of art. 4, of the Constitution of
this state in relation to the passage of local or special laws. The above
law shows that it was designed to operate in the present, and on an existing state of facts, i. e., "in all counties in this state in which is located
a city of over 50,000 inhabitants." The court takes judicial notice of
the census returns, and it is found that Jackson county is the only county
in the state to which the law can be made applicable, or was intended
to be applied when the act was passed. This fact is as apparent as if that
county were designated by name instead of by a circumlocution. State
v. County Court of Jackson County, 85 or 86 Mo.
CONTRACT.

Contracts-Blds-Building Committee.-A mere bid in answer to an
advertisement for proposals for building does not constitute a contract:
Howard v. Maine IndustrialSchool, 78 Me.
A conditional acceptance, such as requiring a bond, delays the completion of the contract until the condition is complied with : Id.
Where one party,7as a corporation, acts through a building committee,
YoL. X2=LV.-7
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a majority of the committee must concur in making any contract, or in
Id.
varying one already made:
Age'ement to make Bequest.-One G. wrote, in 1869, to his nephew,
who was then living in Germany, that if he would come to this country
and take care of him and his wife, who were childless, that he would
leave him all his fortune; and that otherwise he need expect nothing
from him. The nephew came accordingly, and took care of his uncle
and aunt for ten years, until the uncle's death. Held, that this constituted a contract enforceable by the nephew against the legatees and
representatives of the uncle, claiming under a will of the uncle which
made no provision whatever for the nephew: Schutt v. .Missionary Soc.
of X. E. Church, 41 N. J. Eq.
CORPORATION. -See Contract.
Judgment before Oryanization-Lienof-Mortyage.-A corporation,
colorably organized under the statute, transacted business and incurred
debts; on which judgments were recovered. After incurring those debts
the corporation perfected its legal organization, and then gave certain
mortgages on its property. Held, that the judgments were entitled to
preference in payment over the mortgages: Bergen v. Po2poise Fishing
Co., 41 N. J. Eq.
Railroad-Powerto Lease other Road-Right of Dissenting Stock.
holders.-The statute of 1880, which provides that any railroad may
lease, consolidate or merge with any other railroad, does not authorize
such lease by the directors against a minority of dissenting stockholders,
so far as the latter's rights are affected thereby. That provision is
merely a legislative authorization, a concession on the part of the legislature of the power to do that which could not lawfully be done without
such authority: Mills v. Central Rd., 41 N. J. Eq.
.The sixth section of the general corporation act which provides that
the charter of every corporation thereafter granted shall be subject to
alteration, suspension or repeal, in the discretion of the legislature, does
not incorporate the act of 1880, supra, in defendants' charter so as to
affect injuriously the vested rights of stockholders : Id.
Where there is no legislative authority for ascertaining the damage
inflicted upon dissenting stockholders by the majority diverting their
vested rights by an illegal lease, and for awarding them compensation
therefor, the court will not assume that function, but will annul the
lease and restore complainants to their position before those rights were
invaded, regardless of the effect of such action upon the lessee: Id.
COVENANT.
Party Wall-Agreement to Pay half the Cost- Whetier a Covenant
running with the Land.-A. and B., the owners of adjoining lots, made
a written agreement that A., in the erection of a building on his lot,
might place one-half of the wall upon the lot of B., suitable for a party
wall, which should continue such forever, to be kept, maintained, repaired and rebuilt at the equal joint expense of both. The agreement
also provided that A. should, in the first place, build and pay for the
wall, and that before B. should use the same, or any part thereof, he
should pay A. the cost of one-half of the wall, and that the provisions
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of the agreement should be taken as covenants running with the land,
and binding upon the executors, heirs, devisees and assigns of the parties, and all persons having, at any time, any interest or estate in said
lots: . eld, that the agreement of B. to pay A. one-half of the cost of
the wall was nota covenant running with the lot of A., but wis personal
to A., and that he, and not his assignee, was entitled to receive the sum
due from B. for his part of the cost, 'and that the wall, when completed,
became the property of each, although A. had the right to retain pos
session of the whole as a security for the payment of the sum due him:
Gibson v. Holden, 115 Ill.
DAmAGES.

EQUITY.

See Injunction.

See Manicipal Corporatfun; Receiver.

Limit as to Amount Involved-Suits under $50.-Lord Bacon's ordinance, declaring that all suits under the value of 10. shall be dismissed,
is in force in New Jersey : Allen v. Demarest, 41 N. J. Eq.
In order to justify a dismissal on the ground that the matter in dispute is beneath the jurisdiction of the court, the inatter in dispute must
be less than $50: Id.
A defendant may avail himself of the objection that the matter in dispute is too trivial to justify the court in entertaining the suit, either by
demurrer or by motion on notice ; Id.
Release to Railroadfor Iyuries- When set aside.--Where a release
to a railroad company for injuries received is brought about by fraud, or
where there has been a mistake of such a character as shows that there
was no aggregatio mentium, or where an unconscionable advantage has
been gained by mere mistake or misapprehension, andwhere there is no
gross negligence on the part of plaintiff, equity will interfere in its discretion. to prevent intolerable injustice: Blair v. C. & A. Rd., 85 or
86 Mo.
When such an instrument is so general in its terms as to release
the rights of a party of which he was ignorant, and which were not
not in contemplation of the bargain at the time it was made, the instrument will be restrained to the purposes of the bargain, and the release
confined to the rights intended to be released: Id.

EVIDENCE.

See Husband and Wife.

Communications between Physician and Patient.-The rule that communications between doctor and patient are confidential and inadmissible as evidence, may be waived by the patient: Blairv. C. & A. Rd.,
81 or 82 Mo.
EXECUTOR. See Usury.
EXECUTION.
Writ directed to Sheriff of another Couty-Power of Court in county
where levied.-Where a judgment is obtained in S. county, and an alias
execution is issued thereon, directed to the sheriff of county B.. returnable to the circuit court of the former county, and the sheriff of tounty
B. levied the execution upon lands in that county, and advertised the
same for sale, and where the defendant files a motion in the circuit court
of county B., to quash the levy, the circuit court of county B. has no
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jurisdiction to hear such motion, the proper forum being county S.,
where the judgment was obtained: .fellier v. Bartlett, 85 or 8& Mo.

FiORmER RE.COVERY.
Jugmentin another State-Pleading.-A judgment of the Supreme
Court of the City and County of New York, in favor of the plaintiff, is
a barto the further prosecution of an action in Maine, between the same
parties, for the same cause, although the action was pending in Maine,
when the other action was commenced in New York - Whiting v. Burger; 78 Me.
Such judgment may be pleaded specially as a bar to the further maintenance of the action here, or it may be proved under the general issue:
Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Proof of .Harrage-Certificate-Evidence.--Apaper found in the
possession of one of the parties to an alleged marriage, or produced by
such -party, purporting to be a marriage certificate, is admissible in proof
of marriage, in civil cases other than actions for seduction, without
proof of its genuineness, or that it was given by one acting in an official
capacity: Inhabitants of Camden. v. Inhabitantsof Belgrade, 78 Me.
In proof of a disputed marriage in civil suits (other than actions for
seduction) cohabitation, reputation, the declarations of the partieswritten or oral-and their conduct, and all other circumstances usually
attending the marriage relation and indicative of its existence, are admissible in evidence; and where there is shown to have been cohabitation for some years, and children born to the parties, it is admissible to
show what kind of a family the woman had previously belonged to and
what kind of a home she had left: Id.
Divorce-Decrees of other State Courts.-Courts of other states have
no authority to decree a divorce between citizens of this state : Gregory
v. Gregory, 78 Me.
The courts of this state are not bound by the findings of courts of
other states upon the jurisdictional question of residence of the parties:
Id.
Divorce-Adultery.-If the party suing for a divorce commits adultery, pending the suit, and after answer filed,. the defendant will be allowed to recriminate by supplemental answer : Fuller v. Fuller, 41 N.
J. Eq.
Adultery committed at any time before the final decree is pronounced,
constitutes a perfect bar to the plaintiff's action : Id.
INJUNCTION.

Suit on Bond-Damages.-Und-ran injunction bond, with condition
that the complainant shall pay such damages as the defendant shall sustain, by reason of the injunction, in case it is finally decided that the
complainant was not equitably entitled to the injunction, a defendant is
entitled to recover a reasonable amount of counsel fees necessarily expended in getting rid of the injunction: "Cookv. Chapman, 41 N. J.
Eq.
But under such a bond, a defendant is not entitled to recover compensation for the time and service be may have devoted to the case, nor to com-
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pensation for the mental strain and anxiety he may have suffered in
consequence of the injunction : Id.
INSURANCE.

Life insurance-LapsedPolicy- Change of Beneficiary-Apportonmet.-An insurance company, in 1869, issued its policy No. 4091, for
one thousand dollars, upon the life of Charles J. Haley, payable to his
wife, Julia A. Haley, her heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns,
requiring quarterly premiums of four dollars and eighty-eight cents.
During her life she paid premiums, amounting to one hundred and sixtyfive dollars and ninety-two cents. Upon her death in March 1877, in
order that Charles J. Haley might acquire to his own use the benefits of
the policy of insurance, he and the company contrived together to allow
the policy to lapse from non-payment of premiums, and the company
issued to Charles J. Haley a new policy of insurance for the same
amount requiring the same quarterly premiums, payable to him or his
legal representatives, dated October 12th 1877, numbered 32,705.
Upon the new policy, he paid in premiums the sum of seventy-eight
dollars and eight cents, and died in September 1881. Policy No. 4091
was not given or assigned to Charles J. Haley, and it was a part of the
consideration for policy No. 32,705: held, on a bill of interpleader by
the company upon which the respective administrators of the estates of
Julia A. Haley and Charles J. Haley were required to interplead, that
the insurance money be divided between the administrators in the proportion of the amount of premiums paid by their respective intestates:
National Life Ins. Co. v. Hfaley,, 78 Me.
Life Insuranee-Beneficiary-TrusteeProcess.-By the terms of a
life insurance policy, the insurance company promised to pay the assured,
his executors, administrators or assigns, for the sole use and benefit of his
four children therein named, and the survivor or survivors of them, the
amount expressed in the policy, after deducting therefrom any indebtedness the company might have on account of the contract, within ninety
days after notice and proof of death : held, 1st. That the insurance, although for the sole use and benefit of the children, was payable, not to
them, but by the express terms of the contract, to his own legal representative, who, upon payment of the insurance, would become a trustee
under an express trust, of the money thus collected for the cestuis gue
trust; 2d. That the administrator of the assured was the only proper
party who could maintain- an action at law upon the contract, the policy
having never been assigned, and the assured having died intestate; 3d.
That the insurance company, before payment over to the administrator
of the amount due upon said policy, is not liable in trustee process at the
suit of a creditor of one of the children named in the policy : Stowe v.
Phinney, 78 Me.
JUDGMIENT. See .Afortgage.
Coirt of Limited Jurisdiction.-Effect of -udgment.-When the
jurisdiction over a case, of a court of limited jurisdiction, depends on
some fact which can be decided without deciding the case on its merits,
the jurisdiction may be questioned and disproved collaterally, although
the jurisdictional fact is averred of record and has been on evidence
actually found by the court: Peoples Savings Bank v. Wilcox, 15 R. I.
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But when the question of jurisdiction is so involved in the subjectmatter of the suit that it cannot be separately decided, the judgment
rendered is conclusive in collateral proceedings : U.
Lu'NATic.
Gnardian-Right to Carry oa Business-Settlement of AccountLiability of Surety.-A guardian of an insane person may carry on the
business of his ward, and the money of the ward thus invested is not a
breach of trust. Distinction between cases of this nature and the administration of estates of deceased persons pointea out. It is within the
power of a probate court to direct the continuance of the business of the
ward, and in many cases it is the plain and obvious duty of the court to
do so: State v. Jones, 85 or 86 Mo.
A reasonable compensation only should be allowed the guardian for
conducting his ward's business, and the five per cent. rule should not
always be adopted: Id.
The annual settlements and orders of approval made thereon by the
probate court are competent evidence to show-and here they do showthat the business was carried on under the eye and supervision of the
court, and this is sufficient, though no previous order therefor was obtained : Id.
Annual settlements of administrators, and of curators and guardians
of minors, are not conclusive, but are subject to review and correction
at final settlement; and annual settlements of a guardian of an insane
person are of the same nature and are only prima facie evidence of
their correctness : Id.
Sureties in a second bond given by such guardian are not liable for
excessive commissions retained by or allowed to such guardian in previous annual settlements under first bond. The general rule is that
sureties are not liable for past defaults unless made so by the terms of
the bond" Id.
This rule evidently applies when the bonds are given under the same
appointment or term of office, as well as where there are different bonds
under successive appointments : Id.
MORTGAGE.
Foreclosure--SubsequentSuit-Assignme. for Benefit of Creditors.
-Foreclosure without sale is a satisfaction of the debt secured only to
the amount of the value of the property taken in foreclosure : Hazard
v. Robinson, 15 R. I.
When after foreclosure without sale the mortgagee brought suit and
obtained judgment, not for a deficiency, but for the whole amount of the
debt: Held, that obtaining the judgment was presumptively a waiver
or disclaimer of the foreclosure and presumptively left the mortgage
subject to redemption in equity: Id.
A. mortgaged certain shares of corporate stock, which although personalty, were by the charter of the corporation transferable by deed, and
then by deed assigned his property for the benefit of his creditors to B.
B. conveyed this property to 0. by deed setting forth the same trusts as
those under which B. had received it from A. C. died: Held, on a
bill to redeem brought by the administrator of A. that the legal title to
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the shares of stock passed to (6.and that the personal representative of
C. was a necessary party to the suit: Id.
Alternative Decree of Foreclosure-Suit at Law on.-On a bill to
foreclose, a decree was entered ordering the respondents to pay a certain
sum to the complainant within a certain time., and in default of such
payment appointing a master to sell the -mortgaged premices and to deposit the proceeds in the registry of the court. Subsequently an action
of debt on judgment was brought by the complainant against the respondents to recover the sum mentioned in the above decree. The respondents pleaded nul tiel record. Held, that the action did not lie, the
decree being in the alternative and on a bill to foreclose : Burgess v.
Souther, 15 R. I.
Foreclosure proceedings in equity are of the nature of proceedings in
rem, and do not ordinarily act in personam : Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

See ConstitutionalLaw.

Town-Right to bring Suit-Bill in Equity by.-If a bill in chancery
be brought in the name of a town without authority of the electors given
at a town meeting, the court may properly dismiss the same on the motion of the defendants, and this the court may do on its own motion,
when its attention is called to the fact that the suit. is being prosecuted
without lawful authority: Kankakee v. Kankakee and Indiana Rd.,
115 Ill.
Under the Illinois system of township organization there is no officer
or board representing the corporate authority of a town. The electors
alone represent it, and they can do so only through town meetings.
Therefore, neither the supervisor nor the hoard of town auditors can
lawfully authorize a suit in chancery to be brought in the corporate
name of their town, or any other action except in the cases named in
the statute : Id.
It is probable that in extreme cases of threatened invasion or destruction of the property rights of a town, any tax-payer who might thereby
be affected in the burden of taxation may prevent such wrong by injunction : Id.
NOTICE.
Real Action-Purchaserpendente lite-H. conveyed to S. a parcel of
real estate, the deed for which was not recorded. A third person, who
had previously levied an execution upon the same real 6state, without
notice of the unrecorded deed, brought an action against H. for the possession of the estate. After that action was entered in court, S. recorded his deed: held, that S. could be regarded in no other light than as
purchaser pendente lite: Smith v. Hodgson, 78 Me.
A purchaser of real estate pendente lite, is chargeable with notice of
the character of the suit, and of the extent of the claim asserted in the
pleadings, in reference to the title to such real estate, without express
or implied notice in point of faet: Id.
As such purchaser, he is bound by any judgment that may have been
entered against the party from whom he has derived his alleged title,
equally as if he had been a party to such judgment from the beginning.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

And the litigating parties are exempted from taking any notice of the
title so acquired; nor are they obliged to make such purchaser a party
to the suit: Id.
PARTY WALLRAinoAD.

See Covenant.

See ConstitutionalLaw ; Corporation.

RECEIVER.
Joint-Stock Companies.-The plaintiffs, four in number, and the defendants, thirteen in number, are members of an unincorporated jointstock company; the property of the company at the commencement of
the suit consisted of a building, a small amount of furniture and $82 in
money, in all of the value of about $1100 ; the stock was divided into
$10 shares, of which the plaintiffs owned twelve shares and the defendants the balance; the building was erected for the use of the Patrons
of Husbandry, of which all the defendants are members and the plaintiffs had been members. Held, that equity does not require that a receiver should be appointed to sell the property and divide the proceeds
among the members of the company: Hinkley v. Blethen, 78 Me
TAXATION.
Non-Resident Trustee.-A trustee resident in another state who holds
as trustee no property in this state is not liable to taxation in the town
where his cestui resides in this state: -Anthony v. Caswell, 15 R. I.
UsuRY.
Loan by Executor-Receipt of Bonus from Borrower.-An agent for
loaning money may take a reasonable commission from the borrower,
even with the knowledge of the lender, and still the transaction will not
be usurious, though the amount of the interest reserved to the lender be
the full lawful interest: Landis v. Saxton, 85 or 86 Mo.
An executor is a trustee and cannot speculate with the trust property,
or make gains therefrom individually beyond his allowed legal compensation, and it is against public policy to allow him to make commissions
over and above that allowed by law by speculating or loaning the trust
fund, hence a contract by such trustee for a bonus from a borrower of
money of the trust estate is illegal. He cannot hold the money thus
illegally made by the use of the trust property, or by the use of his
position as trustee. No court will enforce the performance of an illegal
contract: Id.
WnI.

See Contract.

Devise-Fee Simple Estate.-Realty was devised to a trustee in fee to
pay over the income to certain named cestuis, no time being limited during which payment was to continue. Provision was made by the will as
to one of the cestuis that in case of his insolvency or of an attachment
of his equitable estate his right to income should terminate and his share
be paid by the trustee to A., B. and C.. their heirs and assigns, also that
the trustee might, in certain contingencies, pay over to the cestui his
whole interest in the trust property "ii fee simple for his own use" free
from all trusts. Hed, that the cestui que trustent took each an equitable
estate in fee simple: Greene v. Wilbur, 15 R. I.

